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WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? –  
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE1 
 
WILLIAM S. COOK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the fact that marriage is a highly legalized institution, the public often forgets or 
fails to recognize that it is established by the laws of the state, is subject to constitutional 
constraints, and must comply with the Due Process Clause, which guarantees that citizens of the 
United States have a fundamental right to marry, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution, which boldly insists upon equal laws.2  While the constitutional implications of a 
ban on same-sex marriage are not often discussed, these issues should not be overlooked, 
because same-sex marriage presents “one of the most important constitutional issues facing 
Americans today.”3  Rather, the legality of a ban on same-sex marriage should be at the forefront 
of the public debate, because it is likely that the judiciary, and specifically the United States 
Supreme Court, will have the final say on same-sex marriage just as the Court has the final word 
on other divisive political issues, such as abortion and the death penalty.  Ultimately, it is 
precisely because of this fact and also because marriage is subject to constitutional limitations 
that the debate on same-sex marriage should focus on the legal aspects of the issue as opposed to 
the moral and religious aspects. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this article, gay or lesbian marriage will be referred to as same-sex marriage. 
2 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is 
a social relation subject to the State’s police power, the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that 
its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“State power over domestic relations is not 
without constitutional limits.”); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (“state regulation of the right of 
access to the marital relationship is subject to constitutional limitations or constraints”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (noting that marriage is a legal institution as it is a licensing law and that 
“the government creates civil marriage” such that there are three consenting partners in a civil marriage: the State 
and the two individuals).  I also recognize that marriage is undoubtedly grounded in social and religious principles, 
but because marriage carries significant legal benefits, it cannot be overemphasized that there is not only a political, 
social, and religious aspect of marriage but also a legal component of marriage constrained by constitutional 
commands. 
3 EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2004).   
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Because marriage is created by the government, it is subject to constitutional review, and 
judges properly determine the constitutionality of marriage laws, as illustrated in Loving v. 
Virginia.4  Contrary to what the current President of the United States, George W. Bush, would 
have us believe, “activist judges” who have been striking down laws barring same-sex marriage 
do not exist.5  The issue of same-sex marriage presents serious and unsettled constitutional 
questions for the judiciary to decide, but President Bush speaks as if judges have no role to play 
in interpreting marriage laws.  Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison,6 
however, that is precisely the job of the judiciary according to the system of checks and balances.  
Ever since Marbury, it has been the role of the courts to declare laws that contravene the 
Constitution invalid and, therefore, “check” the legislature.7  Judges who proclaim a prohibition 
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional are doing nothing more than fulfilling the mandate of 
judicial review so famously laid down by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury.  “To label the 
court’s role as usurping that of, the Legislature . . . is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of 
judicial review.”8 
                                                 
4 The Court held that a Virginia marriage statute that prohibited marriage between individuals of different races was 
unconstitutional.  See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
5 In his 2004 State of the Union address, the President admonished “activist judges” for “redefining court order, 
without regard for the people and their elected representatives” and for imposing their “arbitrary will” upon the 
people of the United States.  He concluded by stating that “[o]ur nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.”  
President George W. Bush, State of the Union (January 20, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
6 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
7 See id. at 177-78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . .  
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that 
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This 
is the very essence of judicial duty.  If, we, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior 
to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they 
both apply.”).   
8 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966.  In further reviewing the state’s ban on same-sex marriage, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts observed, “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution requires that legislation meet certain criteria 
and not extend beyond certain limits.  It is the function of the courts to determine whether these criteria are met and 
whether these limits are exceeded.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 3
 The importance of an article delineating the constitutional and legal issues surrounding 
same-sex marriage should be clear; it is entirely because the courts will assuredly determine 
whether same-sex marriage is legalized in the United States that the constitutional issues 
involving same-sex marriage must be reviewed and discussed.  Practically speaking, though, the 
issue of same-sex marriage is important because certain couples are being denied hundreds of 
legal rights, and the effects of that denial have everyday implications which opposite-sex couples 
likely take for granted.  Challenging the ban on same-sex marriage is critical because same-sex 
couples are denied access to their loved one’s hospital room, barred from the opportunity to have 
a marriage ceremony that is highly cherished in our culture, prohibited from publicly and legally 
declaring their love and commitment to one another, and deprived of countless other legal and 
social benefits.  More importantly, same-sex couples are also deprived of the respect they 
deserve, which could be validated by providing them with the same rights afforded to 
heterosexual couples.  In short, this paper is important because same-sex couples have the right 
to demand that their relationships be respected and given legal effect. 
This paper examines the constitutionality of a ban on same-sex marriage.  First, this 
article discusses the previous legal challenges to same-sex marriage throughout the United 
States.  Second, it analyzes the constitutional fundamental right to marry and describe why it 
applies to same-sex couples.  This note then explains why the ban on same-sex marriage cannot 
meet strict scrutiny, and if the fundamental right to marry does not apply to same-sex couples, 
this paper argues that a ban on same-sex marriage cannot survive even rational basis review.  
Next, this article discusses why the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a ban on same-sex marriage as it invidiously and arbitrarily discriminates on the basis 
of sex and is entirely inconsistent with the principles of equality guaranteed in the Fourteenth 
 4
Amendment.  In doing so, this paper explains why homosexuals should receive some form of 
heightened scrutiny and also why a ban on same-sex marriage is sex discrimination.  Finally, this 
note explores the political solution of civil unions, which provide same-sex couples with the 
legal rights granted to opposite-sex married couples, demonstrating why it is an unconstitutional 
solution to same-sex marriage as it violates the prohibition of separate but equal articulated in 
Brown v. Board of Education.9  As a result of civil unions being constitutionally inadequate, the 
only legal remedy is to grant same-sex couples equal marital rights and thus access to the 
institution of marriage. 
I. BACKGROUND 
a. Gay Legal Issues and the Supreme Court 
Homosexuals have until recently been unsuccessful in the legal arena.  The Court has 
previously ruled against homosexuals on three major occasions.  Most notably, in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the Court asked whether there was a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy, and the Court held that sodomy, an inherently homosexual act, could be criminalized by 
the government.10  As a result of Bowers, it became constitutional for a state to impose criminal 
penalties upon the sexual acts of homosexuals.  The Court also ruled against homosexuals in Boy 
Scouts of American v. Dale11 and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston.12  In Dale, a gay scoutmaster challenged his expulsion from the Boy Scouts.13  The 
Court held in favor of the Boy Scouts, who sought to exclude and discriminate against gays, such 
as the plaintiff, because they did not believe that gays were, among other things, “morally 
                                                 
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
10 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
11 530 U.S. 640 (2000) 
12 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
13 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. 
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clean.”14  The Court stated that the Boy Scouts, as a private organization, could legally exclude 
homosexuals from their group.15  The Court made this ruling even in light of New Jersey’s 
public accommodation law, which arguably applied and would have prohibited the Boy Scouts 
from excluding gays or homosexuals.16  Similarly, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court held that prohibiting a group of gays and lesbians from 
marching in the Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade was also constitutional even in light of the 
state’s public accommodation law because requiring the defendants to include the plaintiffs in 
the parade violated the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council’s First Amendment rights.17   
Until recently, the Court had only decided one case in favor of the homosexual litigant – 
Romer v. Evans.18  In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 to the Colorado 
Constitution, which prevented homosexuals from seeking the benefits of anti-discrimination laws 
in areas such as employment and housing.19  The Court held that the amendment was invalid 
because it could not satisfy even the most lenient standard of review, rational basis.20  The Court 
found that the statute was purely motivated by animosity toward homosexuals, and such a 
justification is never valid under any standard of review.21  As the Court announced, Amendment 
2 “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”22  The 
Court declared this amendment constitutionally impermissible.   
                                                 
14 See id. at 651. 
15 See id. at 656. 
16 See id. at 645 (a New Jersey statute prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public 
accommodation). 
17 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566. 
18 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
19 See id. at 635-36. 
20 See id. at 635. 
21 See id. at 632. 
22 Id. at 633. 
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In 2003, homosexuals enjoyed a triumph in the judicial arena due to the Court’s decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas.23  Lawrence overruled the Bowers holding that sodomy could be 
criminalized.24  Instead, the Court noted that there were several personal decisions that deserved 
respect and could not be made subject to state intervention or criminal penalty, and that included 
the ability to engage in private, consensual sexual behavior.25  “Liberty presumes an autonomy of 
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”26  
“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as 
heterosexual persons do.”27  The Court believed that consensual homosexual conduct that 
occurred in the privacy of one’s home was not constitutionally subject to government 
restrictions.28   
b. Same-Sex Marriage Legal Challenges 
 Even though same-sex marriage appears to be a relatively new political issue, it has been 
an issue in the legal arena for years.  The first case to address the issue of same-sex marriage and 
rule favorably for the same-sex couples was Baehr v. Lewin.29  The Hawaiian Supreme Court 
held that strict scrutiny applied where the plaintiffs, a number of same-sex couples, challenged 
the constitutionality of the Hawaiian marriage statute strictly defining marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman.30  The court ruled that strict scrutiny applied because the 
marriage statute discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Hawaiian Constitution’s 
                                                 
23 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
24 See id. at 578. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. at 562. 
27 Id. at 574. 
28 See id. at 578. 
29 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
30 See id. at 68. 
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guarantee of equal protection.31  Note, however, that the court did not rule that the ban on same-
sex marriage was invalid; rather, the narrow issue before the court was to determine what 
standard applied, and the case was therefore remanded to the lower court to examine the statute 
under strict scrutiny.32  Nevertheless, same-sex marriage never became legal in Hawaii because 
Hawaiian citizens subsequently passed a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.33   
The first case to affirmatively declare that a ban on same-sex marriage was 
unconstitutional was Baker v. State where the Vermont Supreme Court held that a ban on same-
sex marriage violated the Vermont Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause.34  The court 
declared that same-sex couples could not be denied access to the same legal benefits and rights 
afforded opposite-sex couples, and, therefore, for the first time a court announced that same-sex 
couples deserved the same legal rights as opposite-sex couples.35  However, the Vermont 
Supreme Court did not mandate that same-sex couples be allowed to marry; the court directed 
the Vermont legislature to fashion the remedy for the constitutional violation.36  The court, 
nonetheless, appeared to favor the civil union, also referred to as a domestic partnership or a 
registered partnership, as opposed to same-sex marriage as it mentioned these legislative 
                                                 
31 See id.  Under the Hawaiian Constitution, classifications that discriminate on the basis of sex are considered 
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.  See id. at 65.   
32 The issue on appeal was whether the trial court had properly dismissed the case with prejudice for failing to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  See id. at 48.  This required the Supreme Court of Hawaii to review the 
issue in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  See id. at 52.  Therefore, the court did not have to resolve the 
question regarding the constitutionality of a prohibition on same-sex marriage but remanded the issue to the trial 
court with instructions to apply strict scrutiny to the marriage statute.  See id. at 56. 
33 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 44. 
34 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  The Common Benefits Clause states, in relevant part, “[t]hat the government is, or 
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not 
for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that 
community . . . .”  VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.  The Vermont Supreme Court also attempted to separate the case from 
any link to federal law by distinguishing the Common Benefits Clause from the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  See Baker, 744 A.2d at 870 (noting that the Common Benefits Clause “differs 
markedly” from the Equal Protection Clause). 
35 See id. at 886. 
36 See id. at 886-88. 
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responses while specifically noting in its opinion that the Vermont Constitution did not require 
that same-sex couples be permitted to marry.37 
The most recent decision on same-sex marriage is Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health.38  In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the highest court in the state, 
declared that a ban on same-sex marriage was invalid according to the state’s constitution.39  The 
court found that there was no rational reason for a ban on same-sex marriage, and the court 
redefined marriage in accordance with the principles of the Massachusetts Constitution, 
pronouncing that civil marriage is “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others.”40  Similar to the Vermont Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts gave the state legislature 180 days to determine how to comply with the court’s 
decision.41  However, when the state senate submitted a question to the Supreme Judicial Court 
asking if it could create a civil union law just as the Vermont Legislature had done, the Supreme 
Judicial Court declared that same-sex couples must be given access to marriage and that a civil 
                                                 
37 See id. (explaining that the “alternative legal status to marriage for same-sex couples”, such as domestic 
partnerships and registered partnerships, that “impose similar formal requirements and limitations, create a parallel 
licensing or registration scheme, and extend all or most of the same rights and obligations provided by the law to 
married partners; further stating “[i]t appears to assume that we hold plaintiffs are entitled to a marriage license.  We 
do not.  We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and 
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.  That the State could do so through a marriage license is 
obvious.  But it is not required to do so . . . .”).  The result of the Vermont legislature’s deliberations was the advent 
of the “civil union”, which grants same-sex couples with the same legal rights as heterosexual couples, but it refers 
to the conduit for those rights by a different name.  See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen. 
Assem., Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 1204 (1991); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 84 ALB. L. REV. 853, 853 (2001). 
38 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  At least one foreign jurisdiction, as well, has recently declared that a law banning 
same-sex marriage is invalid.  See Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276 (holding that a ban on same-sex 
marriage violates the human dignity clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).  Also, in 2001, the 
Netherlands legalized same-sex marriage, becoming the first country to do so.  See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 5.  
Additionally, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and France have recognized same-sex unions in the form of registered 
partnerships.  See id.   
39 “We declare that barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely 
because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”  Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d at 969. 
40 Id. (emphasis added). 
41 See id. at 970.  
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union law would not be constitutionally sufficient.42  As a result, in May 2004, same-sex couples 
were allowed to marry for the first time in the United States, and currently, Massachusetts is the 
only state that permits same-sex marriage.43 
Despite Baehr, Baker, and Goodridge, most courts have held that same-sex couples do 
not have the right to marry.44  In many of these situations, the courts first declare that the current 
state statute does not permit same-sex marriages, and, secondly, the court concludes that the 
restriction on same-sex marriages is constitutional.45  Incredibly, in upholding a marriage law 
that prohibited same-sex marriage, one court declared, incorrectly as the article proves, that there 
are no constitutional issues requiring even a discussion of the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage.46  In addition, in an uncommon situation where two males married even though one 
male believed the other person was a woman, the court invalidated the marriage because the state 
would not allow marriages between individuals of the same sex.47   
                                                 
42 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
43 See “Same-sex couples exchange vows in Massachusetts”, May 17, 2004, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.samesex.marriage/index.html.  In addition to the Baehr, Baker, and 
Goodridge decisions, the Superior Court of Alaska also ruled that Alaska’s marriage law prohibiting same-sex 
marriage was invalid.  See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. 1998).   
44 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (“It appears 
to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court 
Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as 
that term is defined.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974) (upholding the ban on same-sex marriages 
because such a ban did not constitute the same invidious discrimination that was found in Loving); Adams v. 
Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (Cent. Dist. Cal. 1980) (applying Colorado law); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 
(Pa. 1984); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
45 See, e.g., Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187-97 (upholding the marriage statute as being rational). 
46 See Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d at 590 (“Baker v. Nelson considered many of the constitutional issues raised by the 
appellants here and decided them adversely to appellants.  In our view, however, no constitutional issue is involved.  
We find no constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.”) 
(emphasis added).  
47 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).  The issue as to whether same-sex 
couples have the right to marry has spilled over into the legal question of whether transsexuals are allowed to marry.  
Unanimously, the courts have held that because the transsexual was still his or her original sex, he or she could not 
marry an individual of the same sex.  See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987); Littleton v. Prange, 9 
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
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In 1996, Congress became involved in the same-sex marriage debate when it passed the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA” or the “Act”).48  The Act defined marriage as a union 
between only one man and one woman, thereby precluding same-sex couples from marrying and 
receiving federal benefits.49  The Act also allowed states to reject any same-sex marriage that 
was legalized in another state.50  Accordingly, Congress has clearly expressed its preference that 
same-sex marriage should never be legalized.   
As a result of Goodridge, the debate on same-sex marriage has been pushed to the 
forefront of the current political landscape, and in the summer of 2004, there was an attempt by 
members of Congress to amend the Constitution in order to define marriage as only between one 
man and one woman.51  For the time being, that proposal has failed.52   
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY AND DUE PROCESS 
 
a. Does the Fundamental Right to Marry Include Same-Sex Couples? 
 
It is by now well-settled that there is a fundamental right to marry arising out of the 
substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.53  
                                                 
48 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004). 
49 “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2004). 
50 “No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any 
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004).  This statute 
implicates constitutional questions involving the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution that 
will not be examined in this article. 
51 See “Gay marriage vote appears doomed”, July 13, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5416297. 
52 See “Senate rejects move to ban same-sex marriage”, July 14, 2004 at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/14/samesex.marriage/index.html. 
53 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due 
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”; “To deny this fundamental 
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so 
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”; “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of 
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1  (“No State . . . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
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However, the right to marry is not well-defined.  There is little definitive guidance on who is 
covered by this fundamental right.  Nonetheless, the case law does provide some direction and 
that guidance indicates that the fundamental right to marry is about choice and applies to all 
couples. 
To qualify as fundamental, a right must be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or 
deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.54  Whether a fundamental right exists 
determines what standard the government must meet in order to sustain the law, and this standard 
often dictates the outcome of the case.  If a fundamental right is involved, the Supreme Court 
will review decisions where those rights are denied under the most stringent of standards – strict 
scrutiny.55  In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, there must be a compelling reason for the denial of 
rights and the law must use the least restrictive means to achieve the stated compelling reason.56  
As a result, if a fundamental right does apply to same-sex couples, the statute banning same-sex 
marriage will be presumptively invalid and the government will have the heavy burden of 
justifying its constitutionality.57  Conversely, if a fundamental right is not involved, rational basis 
applies, and the law will be upheld if it has a rational relation to a legitimate government 
interest.58  Rational basis is the most lenient standard of review and presumes that a law is 
constitutional.59 
Whether same-sex couples are included in the fundamental right to marry depends on the 
framing of the issue.  Despite what opponents of same-sex marriage may believe, the issue is not 
whether there is a fundamental right for same-sex couples to marry.  The Court has narrowly 
                                                 
54 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
55 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
56 See id. 
57 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (noting that laws subject to strict 
scrutiny are presumed to be invalid). 
58 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 632 
59 See F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (explaining that rational basis review bears 
a “strong presumption of validity”). 
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defined similar issues in the past only to overrule them.  In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court 
framed the issue as whether there was a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy.60  The Court answered that question with a resounding “no.”61  As the dissent in Bowers 
correctly noted and also as the majority opinion in Lawrence stated, that is precisely not the 
issue.62   
This case is no more about ‘a fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy’ as the Court purports to declare than Stanley v. Georgia was about a 
fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a 
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.  Rather, this 
case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’63 
   
Bowers, however, was properly overruled in Lawrence.64  Therefore, the Court has 
clearly indicated that framing the issue too narrowly in a similar context is incorrect.  In no way 
does a case involving same-sex marriage concern the narrow question of whether homosexuals 
have the right to marry or whether same-sex marriage is deeply rooted in the United States 
history and traditions.  The issue, as illustrated by the Bowers dissent and Lawrence, is much 
broader than that.  “Just as the Perez [v. Lippold] and Loving courts viewed their question as the 
fundamental right to marry, and not the fundamental right to interracial marriage, so too should 
courts take the same stand with respect to gay marriages.”65  As one court has wisely recognized, 
the proper question is whether there is a fundamental right to choose one’s own marriage partner.  
                                                 
60 “The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage 
in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so 
for a very long time.”  478 U.S. at 190.   
61 See id. at 191. 
62 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“To say that the 
issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have 
sexual intercourse.”). 
63 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 567.   
64 “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding 
precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
65 Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, “To Love and Honor All the Days of Your Life”: A Constitutional Right to Same-
Sex Marriage?, 43 CATH. U.L. REV. 907, 934 (1994). 
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In Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, the Alaska Superior Court stated that the question is not 
“whether same-sex marriage is so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right”; rather, 
the real question is “whether the freedom to choose one’s own life partner is so rooted in our 
traditions” to render it a fundamental right that would include all individuals and not only 
heterosexuals.66 
However, Brause was a state court decision and not based on federal law, which prompts 
the question of how the federal right to marry is defined.  Is it limited only to heterosexual 
couples?  Does the right extend to same-sex couples?  Interracial couples?  All couples?  With 
the exception of Loving, these questions have never been directly decided by the Court.  What is 
clear is that the Court has never held that the right to marry applies only to heterosexual couples.  
While there may be an assumption that this right has only previously applied to opposite-sex 
couples, there has been no holding by the Court that would bind it to preclude same-sex couples 
from falling within the purview of the fundamental right to marry.  Upon further review of the 
case law, though, it is clear that the fundamental right to marry applies to all couples and it is 
based upon choice just as the Alaska court in Brause stated.67 
The Supreme Court has explained the fundamental right to marry in numerous cases.  
The Court first mentioned marriage in Maynard v. Hill, declaring that it is “the most important 
relation in life” and is “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be 
neither civilization nor progress.”68  Also, the Court previously described marriage as 
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”69  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court 
                                                 
66 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4. 
67 See id. at *1 (“The court finds that marriage, i.e., the recognition of one’s choice of a life partner is a fundamental 
right.”; emphasis added). 
68 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). 
69 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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linked marriage to the Constitution, stating that the right to marry is central to an individual’s 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.70  The Court later said that  
[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as 
any involved in our prior decisions.71  
  
The personal decision relating to marriage is one the Court has said is a decision that “an 
individual may make without unjustified government interference.”72  For some reason, however, 
this “noble purpose” and “personal decision” is denied to same-sex couples. 
However, this language from the Court does not adequately describe the precise scope of 
the right to marry, which was most significantly affirmed in Loving, where the court struck down 
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law.73  The Virginia laws voided all marriage agreements between 
individuals of different races and precluded interracial marriage.74  But the Court held that those 
laws were unconstitutional in light of the fundamental right to marry.75  Among other things, the 
Court stated that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”76  The 
                                                 
70 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
71 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
72 Casey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
73 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
74 Section 20-57 of the Virginia Code stated, “Marriages void without decree. – All marriages between a white 
person and a colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process.”  Id. at 5.  
Section 20-54 said, in relevant part, “Intermarriages prohibited; meaning of term ‘white persons.’ – It shall hereafter 
be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture 
of blood than white and American Indian.”  Id.  Additionally, the Virginia marriage laws imposed criminal sanctions 
on interracial couples.  See id. at 4 (“Punishment for marriage. – If any white person intermarry with a colored 
person, or any colored person intermarry a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.”).   
75 See id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
76 Id.   
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fundamental right to marry was later reaffirmed in other cases, such as Zablocki v. Redhail and 
Turner v. Safley.77   
While the underlying assumption is that the fundamental right to marry has applied only 
to heterosexual couples, what lies at the heart of the fundamental right to marry, as illustrated by 
Loving, is not heterosexuality but the issue of choice and the ability of an individual to choose 
whom he or she wishes to marry without governmental interference.78  The Court’s decisions 
have unequivocally linked marriage to personal choice.79  Several state courts have explicitly 
recognized that marriage, above all else, is related to choice and is a “right of individuals.”80  
“Clearly, the right to choose one’s life partner is quintessentially the kind of decision which our 
culture recognizes as personal and important.  Though the choice of a partner is not left to the 
individual in some cultures, in ours it is no one else’s to make.”81   
According to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ view on marriage, “the right 
to marry means little if it does not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject 
to appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare.”82  
The court says quite clearly that marriage is a matter of personal, private choice but not just for 
heterosexuals.83  “Whether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and whether 
                                                 
77 434 U.S. 374 (1978); 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  Zablocki held that it was unconstitutional for the state of Wisconsin to 
pass a statute requiring certain individuals – those under obligations to pay child support - to obtain a court order 
before marrying.  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 390-91.  The Court stated “the right to marry is of fundamental 
importance for all individuals.”  Id. at 384.  In Turner, the Court ruled that a prison rule that did not permit inmates 
to marry while incarcerated unless the marriage was approved by prison superintendent was unconstitutional.  See 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 99.  The Court, however, applied rational basis review because the case involved a prison.  See 
id. at 94 (“The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of 
incarceration.”).  The restriction could not withstand that standard.  See id. at 98.   
78 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (discussing the “freedom of choice” to marry).   
79 See, e.g., id. 
80 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948). 
81 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4 (emphasis added). 
82 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 (emphasis added). 
83 “The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with 
others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many ‘right’ ways of conducting those 
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose 
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and how to establish a family – these are among the most basic of every individual’s liberty and 
due process rights.”84  Choosing one’s partner is central to marriage.  Notably missing from these 
decisions, however, is an explicit link between marriage and heterosexuality. 
While these cases demonstrate that marriage is, first and foremost, about choice, they are 
not decisions that bind the United States Supreme Court.  Nonetheless, like the state courts, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental right to marry is about choice.  “This Court 
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one 
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”85  Most 
importantly for same-sex marriage advocates, though, is that one of the seminal cases involving 
the fundamental right to marry – Loving – constantly refers to the fundamental right as the 
“freedom to marry” and as the “freedom of choice to marry,” indicating the inherent nature of 
marriage as a choice that cannot be infringed upon by the government.86  For example, the Court 
stated “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discrimination.  Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or 
not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed upon 
by the State.”87  In no uncertain terms, Loving expressly classifies the right to marry as an issue 
of choice, which extends to all couples and does not only apply in circumstances involving race.  
There is no reference in Loving to marriage being limited to only couples of the opposite sex, and 
the Court specifically rejected the fact that marriage was limited to only couples of the same 
race. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.”  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
84 Goodridge, 798 N.E. at 959. 
85 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977); Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
86 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
87 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Court’s decisions in Turner and Zablocki further suggest that choice is a vital aspect 
of the right to marry.  In Zablocki, the Court held that the state of Wisconsin could not prevent 
parents who owed child support from marrying, and in Turner, the Court similarly held that a 
prison could not enforce a rule that prohibited prisoners from marrying while incarcerated.88  
Without specifically mentioning the principle of choice, both decisions inherently rely on the fact 
that the choice to marry is an individual’s decision to make and cannot be restrained by the 
state.89  In invalidating the Wisconsin law and the prison’s policy, the Court indicated that it does 
not permit any restrictions on the ability of an individual to choose whether he or she wishes to 
marry or whom he or she wishes to marry.90  Choice, then, was critical in these decisions. 
The Court’s decision in Lawrence further supports the contention that the fundamental 
right to marry relates to choice and not the sex of the individuals involved.91  Lawrence held that 
sodomy could not be criminalized because there are certain decisions, such as the ability to 
engage in consensual sexual conduct that must be respected by the state.92  “When sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the Constitution 
                                                 
88 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376 (affirming the trial court’s decision declaring that the Wisconsin statute was 
unconstitutional); Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
89 See, e.g., id. at 98 (“where the inmate wishes to marry a civilian, the decision to marry . . . is a completely private 
one”). 
90 The Court in Zablocki was greatly concerned with the government’s interference in the decision to marry and 
stated that when the government interferes with that decision, strict scrutiny applies; otherwise rational basis applies 
to reasonable regulations of “the marital relationship.”  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (“reasonable regulations 
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.  
The statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to 
marry.”). 
91 Obviously, Lawrence is not directly on point since it involves the constitutionality of a criminal sodomy statute, 
but there are numerous examples of persuasive language in Lawrence that support the right to marry as a matter of 
choice.  The fact that Lawrence is not directly on point does not hurt this argument because there is no binding 
decision directly on point for the issue of same-sex marriage.  All support, then, is merely persuasive.  This paper 
merely argues that the cases cited throughout are more highly persuasive than any others to the contrary. 
92 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”93  Just as choice is a central aspect of 
what sexual relations one is to engage in, so too is it a central aspect of marriage.  If the state 
must recognize individual autonomy and personal decisions on issues of intimate sexual 
behavior, it follows that the state must also respect individual decisions regarding marriage since 
marriage is a fundamental right and is in a similar relation to decisions of sexual intimacy.94  
Marriage, like the choice to engage in consensual sexual conduct, is also an intimate personal 
decision, possibly the most personal decision one may ever make, and the Court has recognized 
marriage as being such.95  If the Court has ruled that personal and private decisions regarding 
consensual sexual conduct must be respected, it is logical to conclude that the personal and 
private decision of whom to marry should similarly be respected regardless of the sex of one’s 
partner. 
Therefore, combining the statements in Lawrence, the holdings of several state courts, 
and, most importantly, the Court’s language and holdings in Loving, LaFleur, Zablocki, and 
Turner, it becomes clear that the fundamental right to marry is linked to choice and not to sexual 
preference.  Certainly it is a factor for heterosexuals that their marriage partner is a member of 
the opposite sex, but that is the inherent nature of being a heterosexual.  What is more 
fundamental to this right is the ability to choose whom one wants to marry without anyone else, 
especially the government, deciding whom he or she must marry and to make that decision 
according to personal choice and love.  It is deeply rooted in this nation’s history that an 
individual has the ability to choose his or her own marriage partner.96  In short, marriage is not 
                                                 
93 Id. at 567. 
94 “The case does involve two adults, who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual 
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”  Id. at 578. 
95 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
96 See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4. 
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just about a man and a woman.  The sex of one’s partner is important in the decision to marry, 
but it is not the primary part of the decision; that part is about love, which can be achieved by 
heterosexuals and homosexuals equally.  It is not fundamental that the couple be members of the 
opposite sex, but “[i]t is the decision itself that is fundamental.”97 
b. Strict Scrutiny 
 
Assuming that the fundamental right to marry does apply to all couples, including same-
sex couples, the government can still deny them the right to marry if the government’s 
justifications satisfy strict scrutiny.  In that case, the government must establish a compelling 
reason for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying, and the statute prohibiting same-sex 
marriage must use the least restrictive alternative to achieve this compelling reason.98 
Three major arguments have been asserted to justify the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage.  Proponents of defining marriage as a union between only a man and a woman 
claim that marriage has traditionally been defined that way and should remain so defined.  
Opponents of same-sex marriage further contend that marriage is sacred and should not be 
altered to allow the inclusion of same-sex couples.  Finally, the ban on same-sex marriage has 
been justified on the grounds that same-sex couples cannot procreate.  Despite these assertions, 
none of these arguments are compelling and sufficiently narrowly tailored and, thus, fail under 
strict scrutiny. 
The argument that marriage should be defined as only between a man and a woman 
simply because that is the way it has traditionally been defined is not a compelling reason to 
justify excluding same-sex couples from marrying.  As several courts have noted, this argument 
                                                 
97 Id. at *6. 
98 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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is circular and does not justify a ban on same-sex marriage.99  “It is not enough to say that 
‘marriage is marriage’ and accept without any scrutiny the law before the court.  It is the duty of 
the court to do more than merely assume that marriage is only, and must only be, what most are 
familiar with.”100  To justify a statute because of its definition makes little sense in light of the 
fact that the definition is precisely what is being challenged.  Simply relying on the proposition 
that marriage is defined a certain way does not create a compelling reason for prohibiting same-
sex marriage when the definition itself is what is at issue.  “The issue . . . is whether the State 
may continue to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits of marriage.  This question is not 
resolved by resorting to a historical definition of marriage; it is that very definition that is being 
challenged . . . .”101  This argument, therefore, is circular, unhelpful, and certainly not 
compelling.102  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes so poignantly and persuasively declared, it is 
“revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.”103  As this quote illustrates, it is not a compelling reason to maintain the status quo 
simply because it is the status quo.  There must be some further justification.  This argument 
alone, then, is not a compelling reason to prevent same-sex couples from marrying.   
In addition, definitions are arbitrary and can change to meet constitutional 
requirements.104  The Court accepted this proposition when it previously redefined marriage in 
Loving.  At the time of Loving, the definition of marriage in Virginia was not just that of a union 
                                                 
99 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961, n.23; Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *2. 
100 Id. 
101 Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
102 Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence, stated “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest 
here, such as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”102  To note, however, Justice O’Connor does 
not explain why the preservation of the traditional institution of marriage is a legitimate state interest.  For the 
reasons stated above, it cannot be a legitimate interest merely because marriage has been traditionally defined a 
certain way.  Justice O’Connor, therefore, must have some other justification for believing that a ban on same-sex 
marriage and preserving traditional marriage involves a legitimate state interest, whatever “traditional” marriage 
may be, but her statement alone discloses no such legitimate or compelling interest. 
103 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years: The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L REV. 
991, 1001 (1997). 
104 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 21. 
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between a man and a woman but a union between a man and a woman of the same race.105  The 
Court held that this definition of marriage was unconstitutional.106  In effect, the Supreme Court 
redefined Virginia’s definition of marriage to conform to constitutional principles that prohibit a 
state from limiting marriage to only couples of the same race.  Therefore, the Court can and will 
redefine marriage to square with the Constitution in the appropriate situation.  Accordingly, the 
Court has the power to declare the current laws defining marriage as a union between a man and 
a woman unconstitutional, and the Court also has the authority to then redefine marriage as a 
union between two individuals and, of course, without restrictions on race.   
Opponents of same-sex marriage further defend excluding same-sex couples on the 
grounds that marriage is a sacred institution and the traditional notion of marriage involves only 
a man and a woman.  One problem with this argument is that marriage may not be as sacred as 
many believe.  It is common knowledge that approximately half of all marriages fail and result in 
divorce.  American society now includes television shows where individuals marry or propose 
marriage after only knowing a person for a short period of time.  Additionally, many couples get 
married for the “wrong” reasons and not because of love, commitment, and the other factors that 
typically result in a stable marriage.  In many respects, marriage is not always the sacred and 
romantic institution of a man and a woman making the ultimate commitment to one another.  
The current institution of marriage is flawed, and society’s sacred institution is not so sacred 
anymore.   
Regardless, denying marriage to same-sex couples because it is sacred is not a 
compelling justification because, similar to the argument above, simply labeling an institution as 
sacred is not a compelling reason that justifies the exclusion of a group to that institution.  There 
                                                 
105 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-5 (citing Virginia’s-then marriage statutes). 
106 See id. at 2. 
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must be some further explanation and rationale that explains why it is so sacred that it justifies 
the exclusion of same-sex couples.  Again, this argument by itself is not a valid legal basis for 
denying same-sex couples access to marriage.  Just as “history cannot and does not foreclose the 
constitutional question” relating to whether a ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional, neither 
does referring to an institution as “sacred” foreclose the constitutional and legal inquiry.107  
Unequivocally, alleging that marriage is “sacred” would not have saved the state of Virginia’s 
argument in Loving, and it should also not be sufficient to exclude same-sex couples from 
marrying.  There simply must be more to explain why same-sex couples are denied this 
fundamental right. 
Moreover, the fact that marriage is sacred weighs against the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the institution of marriage.  Since marriage is sacred and highly valued in our 
society, it should be denied to a group of individuals only for the most compelling reasons, and 
this is essentially what the Supreme Court has held.  However, no such reason exists in this 
situation.  Additionally, there is no reason to believe that allowing same-sex couples to marry 
will hurt the institution of marriage.  “Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of 
the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex marriage, any more than 
recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person of a different race devalues the marriage 
of a person who marries someone of her own race.”108  The Court’s decision in Loving did not 
ruin marriage, and, similarly, permitting same-sex couples to marry would not destroy the sacred 
institution of marriage. 
Further, no one can reasonably deny that same-sex couples can love, commit, and form a 
long-lasting bond with each other just as opposite-sex couples do.  Goodridge clearly 
                                                 
107 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953. 
108 Id. at 965. 
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demonstrates that same-sex couples are entirely capable of this and any belief to the contrary is 
blatantly mistaken.109  As the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts noted, the same-sex 
couples in Goodridge were not only entirely capable of engaging in normal family activities, 
such as raising children, aiding in the care of a partner’s parent, etc., but they had, in fact, 
engaged in those activities.110  Also, in Turner, the Court held that prisoners could not be 
prohibited from marrying and that in prison they still could engage in “expressions of emotional 
support and public commitment.”111  If prisoners can do this, there is absolutely no reason to 
believe that same-sex couples are somehow incapable of the same, if not better, “expressions of 
emotional support and public commitment.”  It simply cannot be denied that same-sex couples 
can fulfill the typical functions of a marriage and a family.  To suggest that homosexuals are not 
capable of creating a normal family relationship is repugnant to all those homosexuals who have 
proven that to be untrue.   
 The final major argument against same-sex marriage is that same-sex couples cannot 
procreate on their own and marriage is sanctioned by the state to further procreation and the 
existence of the human race.  Marriage statutes, however, do not require that heterosexual 
couples have the ability to procreate before the state allows them to marry, but, as the argument 
goes, that requirement is the dispositive issue in prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying.  
The legal issue concerning procreation, therefore, centers on whether same-sex couples can be 
excluded from marrying when other couples who also cannot procreate are allowed to marry.  
The procreation argument, however, does not survive strict scrutiny analysis because (1) there is 
no compelling interest in excluding same-sex couples from marriage on procreation grounds and 
                                                 
109 See id. at 949 (describing the plaintiffs’ relationships and noting that at least one couple had been together for 
thirty years). 
110 See id. 
111 Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.  
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(2) even if there is a compelling interest, the government has not used the least restrictive means 
to achieve that interest. 
Undeniably, there is some link between marriage and procreation.  Fostering the 
institution of marriage certainly cultivates procreation, and the state has an interest in advancing 
this relation because of that fact.  But marriage is not simply about procreation, nor is it even 
primarily about procreation.112  “Procreation or child rearing are not necessarily the defining 
characteristics of a traditional marriage; rather, such a limiting characteristic is grossly 
underinclusive.”113  Marriage is about much more than just procreation.  “First and foremost, 
marriage requires a commitment to a relationship.”114  Marriage is also about love and being able 
to choose with whom one will spend the rest of his or her life.  Marriage is about forming a bond 
with another individual.  Marriage is, in part, about procreation, but it is also a multitude of other 
important factors. 
Therefore, it is not a compelling reason for the government to deny same-sex couples the 
ability to marry simply because they cannot physically engage in one aspect of marriage that is 
important to some married couples.  Same-sex couples can fulfill the other important aspects of 
marriage, such as fostering a long and loving bond and commitment to one another.  Goodridge 
proves that any argument to the contrary is simply false.  Accordingly, it is not compelling for 
the state to prohibit same-sex marriage even though same-sex couples cannot satisfy one of the 
aspects of marriage yet can fulfill all the rest.  The government simply cannot select an arbitrary 
                                                 
112 In Goodridge, the court rejected the trial court’s holding that a ban on same-sex marriage was constitutional 
because procreation is the primary purpose of marriage.  See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; see also Zambrowicz, 
supra note 65, at 926 (“While procreation is an important element of most marriages, it is most assuredly not the 
only, nor always the most important, element.”). 
113 Id. at 921. 
114 See Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity Implications of Same-Gender 
Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353, 359 (1999) 
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characteristic of marriage and base the exclusion of same-sex marriage on that one factor when 
marriage is about much more than just being able to have children. 
 It appears to be even more questionable that same-sex couples are denied the ability to 
marry because they cannot procreate when being married involves many more rights, 
responsibilities, and benefits that in no way relate to procreation.  There are numerous benefits 
and advantages granted to married couples.115  This is the reward society has given to married 
couples who wish to form long-lasting stable bonds.  Those benefits include receiving certain 
rights such as joint tax filing, tenancy by entirety, homestead rights, the rights to inherit the 
property of a deceased spouse who does not have a will, a right to elective share under intestacy 
laws, entitlement owed to a deceased employee, preferential treatment under pension plans, 
medical coverage or benefits, alimony rights, and the right to bring claims for wrongful death of 
one’s spouse, among many other legal as well as social benefits.116  As this list makes evident, 
marriage confers rights to married couples well beyond anything that is remotely related to 
procreation.  Therefore, justifying the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry and 
excluding them from these numerous rights and benefits simply because they cannot physically 
engage in an act unrelated to those rights and benefits is not a compelling rationale. 
Since it is not a requirement that couples be able to have children or even have intentions 
to procreate before marrying, the denial of marriage to same-sex couples on procreation grounds 
is troublesome.  Even Justice Scalia recognizes that this argument is tenuous at best.  “[W]hat 
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples 
                                                 
115 “The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and 
death.  The department states that ‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to marriage and to marital benefits.”  Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d at 955. 
116 This list is not exhaustive but merely notes some of the rights by reference as indicated by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge.  See id. at 955-56.  For other rights conferred by marriage see Baehr, 852 
P.2d at 59, and Eckols, supra note 114, at 404-05. 
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exercising ‘the liberty protected by the Constitution’?  Surely not the encouragement of 
procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”117  Heterosexuals who cannot 
procreate, such as those mentioned in Justice Scalia’s quote, can still marry.  However, same-sex 
couples who also cannot physically procreate are not permitted to marry.  Procreation, therefore, 
is not a compelling reason for excluding same-sex couples.  To select procreation as the defining 
characteristic of marriage and then exclude the ability to marry to some and not others who 
cannot fulfill that aspect is absolutely arbitrary. 
It must also be noted that it is simply not the case that same-sex marriage would 
negatively affect procreation.  It makes little sense to deny same-sex couples the right to marry 
on procreation grounds when allowing them to marry would not negatively affect or even 
decrease procreation.  If the decision to allow same-sex couples to marry would adversely impact 
the furtherance of the human race, the government may have a compelling reason to prohibit that 
practice, but no one could rationally argue that same-sex marriage would affect opposite-sex 
couples’ ability to have children.  “Certainly there is no . . . empirical data submitted which 
demonstrates that marriage is nothing more than a refuge for persons deprived by legislative fiat 
of the option of consensual sodomy outside of the marital bond.”118  It is simply not the case that 
by denying same-sex couples the right to marry, homosexuals would marry members of the 
opposite sex and have children.  Allowing same-sex marriage would not preclude individuals 
who would normally procreate from doing so.  What same-sex couples did with their marital 
relation would not prevent opposite-sex couples from procreating and continuing the human 
race.  As a result, because procreation is not a compelling reason to prohibit same-sex marriage 
                                                 
117 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
118 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E. 936, 952 (N.Y. 1980); see also Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo 1994), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).   
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and because same-sex marriage will not negatively impact procreation, it is not a valid 
justification to exclude same-sex couples from the right to marry under strict scrutiny. 
Assuming arguendo that there is a compelling reason for the government to deny same-
sex couples the right to marry because they cannot procreate, the marriage laws still cannot 
survive strict scrutiny because they do not use the least restrictive means to achieve the 
compelling purpose.  Statutes subject to strict scrutiny are upheld only if they are “‘necessary to 
promote a compelling government interest,’” meaning that the government must use the least 
restrictive methods in achieving that compelling interest.119  Since marriage laws do not use the 
least restrictive methods to achieve the presently assumed compelling purpose of procreation, 
they are patently unconstitutional. 
In order to satisfy this standard, the marriage statutes would only allow couples that could 
procreate to marry.  Marriage laws, however, impose no such requirement.  Instead, there is 
nothing to bar infertile couples, elderly couples who physically cannot procreate, or even couples 
who have no intention of having children from marrying.120  Yet same-sex couples cannot marry, 
as the argument goes, because they cannot physically procreate on their own.  As one New York 
court correctly noted, “it cannot be held as a matter of law that the physical incapacity to 
conceive is a bar to entering the marriage state.”121  “If procreation were a necessary component 
of civil marriage, our statutes would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of 
nonmarital child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital means.”122  As the quote 
rightfully points out, marriage laws do not employ the least restrictive alternatives in promoting 
                                                 
119 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)). 
120 See Wendel v. Wendel, 52 N.Y.S. 72, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).  After Lawrence, “the passions incident to that 
state” cannot be criminalized for same-sex couples. 
121 Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605. 
122 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962. 
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procreation.  Since it is plainly not a prerequisite that a couple have the ability to procreate in 
order to marry, the marriage laws violate the Constitution and cannot bar same-sex marriage. 
To note, one of the fears that many opponents of same-sex marriage have is that if same-
sex couples are permitted to marry, the judicial floodgates will open and polygamists, children, 
brothers and sisters, humans and animals, etc. will be allowed to marry.123  This fear is 
completely unfounded.  There is a major distinction to be made in this situation; there are 
compelling reasons to prevent the abovementioned individuals from marrying but there is no 
such compelling interest in prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying. 
Polygamists, children, siblings, and others denied the ability to marry the person of their 
choice all have the right to ask the government to articulate sufficient justifications explaining 
their exclusion from the institution of marriage.124  As explained above, the fundamental right to 
marry applies to all individuals, and, accordingly, it can only be denied provided the government 
satisfies strict scrutiny review.  The difference, though, is that compelling reasons exist in each 
of these circumstances whereas no such compelling reason is present in the state’s prohibition of 
same-sex marriage.  “For example, states . . . may and do prohibit marriage for such 
‘compelling’ reasons as consanguinity (to prevent incest), immature age (to protect the welfare 
of children), presence of venereal disease (to foster public health), and to prevent bigamy.”125  
Also, specifically with regards to polygamy, it has historically presented problems of abuse, such 
as forced marriages, exploitation of minors, and welfare dependency, that substantiate any 
                                                 
123 For example, in his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia bemoans the idea that “laws against fornication, bigamy, 
adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” are effectively ended because of the Court’s decision.  See 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual 
morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the abovementioned laws can survive rational-basis review.”  
Id.  Justice Scalia’s concerns are sorely misplaced.  Those laws are not automatically overruled; rather, the law 
merely requires that there be some justification other than the fact that society believes them to be immoral.   
124 “[P]olygamists have the same right as same-sex couples to go to court and demand that the state give real reasons 
– not just stereotypes and unsupported generalizations – for banning their marriage.”  GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 
105. 
125 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59, n.19. 
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prohibition on polygamy.126  Arguments that the legalization of same-sex marriage will allow 
just about any type of marital relationship are misguided.  Just as with the issue of same-sex 
marriage, the government must justify its reasons for denying marriage to any individual.  The 
government, however, cannot justify the marital exclusion of same-sex couples, but it can justify 
the exclusion of other relationships. 
c. Rational Basis 
If the Supreme Court does not hold that the fundamental right to marry applies to same-
sex couples, the marriage laws must still satisfy rational basis review.  However, it is a very 
different question to ask whether the denial of same-sex marriage invokes legitimate state 
interests as opposed to compelling ones because rational basis review is highly deferential to the 
legislative branch, whereas strict scrutiny is, of course, strict and favors the unconstitutionality of 
a law.127  Laws reviewed under rational basis will be upheld if there is a legitimate governmental 
interest and the law is rationally related to that interest.128  Any rational reason will be sufficient 
to uphold the law even if it is not the legislature’s stated purpose.129  If the law is arbitrary or 
capricious, it cannot survive under rational basis review.130  Additionally, laws based on animus 
towards a specific group are never constitutionally justified.131  Because marriage laws arbitrarily 
deny same-sex couples the right to marry and are based on animus towards homosexuals and 
same-sex couples, they are patently unconstitutional. 
In analyzing the same factors as mentioned above, neither the argument that marriage is 
defined as a man and a woman or that marriage is sacred is a rational reason to deny same-sex 
                                                 
126 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 102.   
127 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing rational basis as “relatively 
deferential”). 
128 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
129 See Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313-15. 
130 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (“Arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it 
classification.”). 
131 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 
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couples the right to marry.  As Justice Stevens said in his dissent in Bowers, which was explicitly 
accepted by the Lawrence majority, “neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack.”132  Similarly, history and tradition are not legitimate 
government interests in excluding same-sex couples from marrying.  Merely labeling marriage as 
sacred or citing historical purposes for the exclusion of same-sex couples are circular and are not 
legitimate for the same reasons they are not compelling; these arguments sidestep the 
constitutional issues.  If laws were upheld because that was the traditional method of doing 
things, time would be the relevant inquiry and not the rationality of the law.  Moreover, if courts 
could uphold laws simply because that is the way things have always been, Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law would have been affirmed in Loving, Texas’ anti-sodomy law would have 
been ruled constitutional in Lawrence, and the Court could not have overturned Plessy v. 
Ferguson and the doctrine of separate but equal.133  “In some parts of our nation mere acceptance 
of the familiar would have left segregation in place”, and it is now almost universally accepted 
today that the change in favor of desegregation was the proper choice.134  The purpose of 
asserting constitutional claims is to allow groups redress for the wrongs society has denied to 
them in the past, and it is simply not rational to uphold those wrongs based upon tradition or by 
calling those traditions sacred.  There must be some further explanation for the state to establish 
a legitimate interest.   
Even though the procreation argument is the best argument opponents of same-sex 
marriage have for upholding the current marriage laws as constitutional, the problem with the 
current marriage laws is that they are not rational but arbitrary.  It is undeniably arbitrary to tell 
                                                 
132 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, 
in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”). 
133 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
134 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *2. 
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one group of individuals who cannot procreate that they are allowed to marry but then exclude 
another group who cannot procreate and justify their exclusion on those grounds.  Obviously, 
there must be some reason that same-sex couples have been excluded but other couples who 
cannot procreate are allowed to marry.  That reason, however, is not related to procreation, and, 
therefore, there must be another explanation for the ban on same-sex marriage, but the only other 
reason would be the arguments made above, but those arguments are neither compelling nor 
rational.  “[I]f the purpose of the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples is to ‘further [] the link 
between procreation and child rearing,’ it is significantly underinclusive.  The law extends the 
benefits and protections of marriage to many persons with no logical connection to the stated 
governmental goal.”135  Clearly, then, the reasons for denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry are “completely unrelated to any rational reason for excluding same-sex couples from 
obtaining the benefits of marriage”, leading to the conclusion that any ban on same-sex marriage 
is nothing more than animus toward same-sex couples and constitutionally invalid.136  Because 
the current marriage laws arbitrarily deprive same-sex couples from marrying, they cannot 
satisfy rational basis review. 
Finally, in his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia scolds the majority because, he 
believes, they erode the possibility that a society may be able to ban a certain practice because 
they find it to be immoral.137  The inherent flaw in Justice Scalia’s reasoning is that merely 
claiming that a practice is immoral does not and should not satisfy rational basis review.  The 
Court’s “obligation is to define liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code.”138  Claiming 
                                                 
135 Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. 
136 Baker, 744 A.2d at 911 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “The absence of any reasonable 
relationship . . . suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or 
who are believed to be) homosexual.”  Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
137 “The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 
‘immoral and unacceptable’ . . . .”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
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that a group can be prevented from doing something simply because it is immoral without further 
justification is not rational or legitimate.  As Justice Stevens correctly noted in his dissent in 
Bowers, which, as mentioned above, was expressly adopted in Lawrence, “the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .”139  To satisfy rational basis 
review, there must be some legitimate explanation to deny same-sex couples the right to marry.  
Just because a large number of people believe a certain practice is immoral does not mean it is 
rational to preclude that practice.   
III. EQUAL PROTECTION, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
a. Homosexuals or Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Class? 
In unequivocal terms, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution proclaims that no 
state shall deny anyone equal protection of the laws.140  Regarding equality, Justice Robert 
Jackson announced, 
[t]he framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there 
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable 
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would 
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.  Conversely, nothing opens 
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and 
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the 
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were 
affected.  Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to 
require that laws be equal in operation.141 
 
                                                 
139 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
140 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1.  As we know from the Supreme Court’s precedent, the Equal Protection Clause is not absolute 
even though the specific language of the amendment would appear to be so.  The Supreme Court has allowed States 
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These wise words espoused by Justice Jackson indicate that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
dedication to equality is one of the United States’ most highly regarded values.142  Yet denying 
same-sex couples the ability to marry strikes at the heart of equality and rejects the fundamental 
principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Because the current marriage laws are inconsistent with 
the principles of equality that are deeply entrenched in the United States’ history, those laws 
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.143   
For Equal Protection purposes, the Court has held that certain classifications are 
inherently “suspect”, requiring more rigid judicial scrutiny when a law discriminates against 
those individuals according to that characteristic.  The three classifications that currently receive 
strict scrutiny review are race, national origin, and alienage.144  Similarly, the Court has held that 
other classifications, while still somewhat suspect, do not implicate as harmful or as invidious 
discrimination as race, national origin, and alienage.  In those situations implicating quasi-
suspect classifications, the Court applies a heightened standard of review above rational basis 
though not as stringent as strict scrutiny.  That standard of review is intermediate scrutiny.  
Classifications that receive intermediate scrutiny are gender/sex and non-marital children.145  If a 
classification does not involve a suspect group, rational basis applies.146  As mentioned above, 
this standard of review is deferential to the separation of powers inherent in the United States 
form of government, and courts will typically defer to the legislature as long as there is a rational 
                                                 
142 It should be noted, however, that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”  
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). 
143  As one scholar has correctly stated, the current bar to same-sex marriage “is one of the issues that most directly 
challenge our commitment to genuine legal equality.”  GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 3. 
144 See id. at 14. 
145 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender discrimination); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (non-
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146 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
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basis for the law.  Classifications that receive rational basis review include, for example, age and 
wealth, among others.147 
The major factors that the Court considers when determining whether to label a group as 
suspect are (1) whether the classification is based upon an immutable characteristic; (2) whether 
the group has suffered a long history of discrimination in the United States; and (3) whether the 
group can protect itself through the legislative process.148  Presently, sexual orientation has not 
been labeled a suspect classification by the Supreme Court.149  Nevertheless, laws delineating 
classifications according to sexual orientation should receive strict scrutiny, or, at minimum, 
intermediate scrutiny. 
First, sexual orientation is immutable.150  This has been a point of contention for years 
among the general public, and many believe that sexual orientation results from choice and is not 
innate.  Studies have shown this to be false and at least two courts, the Ninth Circuit and the 
Colorado Supreme Court, have indicated that being homosexual is not a choice.151  Sexual 
orientation is something with which an individual is born and is beyond the power of the 
individual to determine.  “[S]cientific research indicates that we have little control over our 
                                                 
147 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age discrimination); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 
(1970) (wealth discrimination). 
148 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (immutability); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 
(1971) (political powerlessness); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (history of 
discrimination); see also GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 62; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973). 
149 However, the Ninth Circuit held that sexual orientation should be a suspect and protected class and that laws 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation should be reviewed under strict scrutiny analysis.  See Watkins v. 
United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Having concluded that homosexuals constitute a suspect 
class, we must subject the Army’s regulations facially discriminating against homosexuals to strict scrutiny.”).  This 
decision was later vacated but affirmed in favor of the plaintiff on different grounds by a full Ninth Circuit panel.  
See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
150 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 31 (noting that homosexuality is, in part, genetically determined).  At 
minimum, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether homosexuality is an immutable characteristic.  See Dean v. 
District of Columbia, 653A.2d 307, 330 (D.C. 1995). 
151 The Ninth Circuit stated, “we have no trouble concluding that sexual orientation is immutable for the purposes of 
equal protection doctrine.”  Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1348.  Also, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that “laws prohibiting discrimination against gay men, lesbians and bisexuals will undermine marriage and 
heterosexual families because married heterosexuals will ‘choose’ to ‘become homosexual’ if discrimination is 
prohibited.”  Evans, 882 P.2d at 1347. 
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sexual orientation.”152  Likely, there are some individuals who choose to be homosexual, but, for 
the most part, sexual orientation is a characteristic that cannot be changed.  Upon sufficient 
expert testimony, a court should be able to conclude that sexual orientation is in fact an 
immutable characteristic. 
Additionally, homosexuals have been discriminated against throughout the history of the 
United States, and to this day there exists widespread hostility toward homosexuals and same-sex 
couples.153  As one scholar explains, “[h]omosexuals are more severely stigmatized than any 
other group in America.”154  Further, “it is indisputable that ‘homosexuals have historically been 
the object of pernicious and sustained hostility.’”155  This is illustrated by the numerous court 
challenges to exclude homosexuals from all parts of society.  For example, the only reason there 
were court challenges in Hurley and Dale is because the South Boston Allied War Veterans 
Council wanted to exclude a gay rights activist group from the St. Patrick’s Day Parade and 
because the Boy Scouts did not want homosexuals as scout leaders.  Similarly, the case of Romer 
v. Evans occurred only because the citizens of Colorado passed a law excluding homosexuals 
from asserting any discrimination claim they might have if they were not hired for a job or did 
not receive housing solely because they were gay or lesbian.  In Bowers, the Court ruled that 
homosexuals did not have the right to engage in typical homosexual sexual activity even in their 
own home, one of the locations that the Court has held to be the most sacred of all places.  Also, 
there are numerous examples of how homosexuals have been treated with malice by the general 
public, such as the brutal murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay man, in 1998.  In short, 
“[h]omosexuals have been the frequent victims of violence and have been excluded from jobs, 
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schools, housing, churches, and even families.”156  Thus, it is incontestable that there has been 
widespread discrimination against homosexuals. 
To fully emphasize this point, the fact that same-sex couples and homosexuals have been 
excluded from the institution of marriage and the public antipathy and hostility towards any 
attempt by homosexuals to seek the same legal rights and benefits provided to every other couple 
in the United States shows in and of itself that there is public aversion towards same-sex partners 
and homosexuals in general.157  This issue has become so important in the political spectrum that 
many politicians, including President George W. Bush, have called for a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as a union between only one man and one woman.158  After the 
Hawaiian Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr, which did not even declare that the state’s 
marriage laws were unconstitutional but only held that those laws were subject to strict scrutiny 
analysis, the hostility towards same-sex marriage was so immense that the court’s decision never 
came into effect because the citizens of Hawaii passed a constitutional amendment prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.159  This unending and furious opposition to providing same-sex couples with 
equal rights shows the dramatic and drastic public hostility toward homosexuals.   
The third factor that the Court analyzes to determine if a group should receive heightened 
scrutiny is whether that group has been able to adequately redress their grievances through the 
legislative process.  This factor also weighs in favor of labeling sexual orientation as a suspect 
class.  Each of the examples mentioned above show that homosexuals and same-sex couples 
                                                 
156 Id.  The court also noted that “the discrimination faced by homosexuals in our society is plainly no less 
pernicious or intense than the discrimination faced by other groups already treated as suspect classes, such as aliens 
or people of a particular national origin.”  Id.   
157 Anyone who claims that homosexuals or same-sex couples are attempting to have “special rights” granted to 
them as Justice Scalia claimed in Romer is misguided.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 638-40.  The debate on same-sex 
marriage is nothing more than same-sex couples asking for access to the same institution that all heterosexuals have.   
158 See President George W. Bush, State of the Union (January 20, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
159 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 44. 
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have little power through the legislative arena.  In Romer, the citizens of Colorado took the 
extreme position of passing an initiative forbidding homosexuals from asserting legal claims for 
discrimination.  The political process surely did not aid homosexuals in Colorado.160  Similarly, 
the Hawaiian Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr never made an impact in Hawaii because the 
citizens passed a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.161  The political process 
there, as well, was no help to homosexuals.  As discussed earlier, there is a large amount of 
opposition to same-sex marriage, and President Bush supports a constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage.162  The current animosity toward legalizing same-sex marriage is 
proof enough that homosexuals are legislatively disadvantaged.163  Most significantly, 
homosexuals had little support for their rights in Congress when it passed the Defense of 
Marriage Act, which expressly denies same-sex couples any legal recognition of their 
relationship by the federal government.164  Simply stated, the legislative process certainly has not 
been conducive to adequately safeguarding the rights of homosexuals and same-sex couples.165 
                                                 
160 It should be noted, however, that Amendment 2 was proposed in response to the success of local ordinances in 
the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the County of Denver banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.  Amendment 2 repealed these ordinances.  See id. at 624. 
161 See GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 44. 
162 See President George W. Bush, State of the Union (January 20, 2004), 
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163 Even if a state did allow same-sex marriage, there are further impediments for same-sex couples, such as the fact 
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relationship may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of marriage.”  A.S. 25.05.013 (cited 
in Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1). 
164 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004). 
165 Most of the major changes in favor of homosexual rights have occurred through the judicial, rather than the 
legislative, process.  The Supreme Court in Romer intervened and informed the citizens of Colorado that it could not 
constitutionally deny homosexuals the right to claim discrimination.  The highest court in the state of Massachusetts 
had to enlighten its legislature that it could not legally ban same-sex marriage; Vermont did as well except it only 
notified the Vermont legislature that it was constitutionally required to provide same-sex couples with equal rights 
but not necessarily access to marriage. 
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In short, homosexuals deserve protection through some form of heightened scrutiny.  
Because homosexuals satisfy the above criteria, strict scrutiny should apply.  However, if, for 
example, the Court finds that homosexuality is not immutable, the other two criteria are easily 
satisfied, and, at minimum, intermediate scrutiny should apply when laws discriminate against 
homosexuals.  Suffice it to say, there are overwhelming reasons for the Court to apply some form 
of heightened scrutiny when facing classifications based upon sexual orientation.   
b. The Ban on Same-Sex Marriage as Sex Discrimination166 
A ban on same-sex marriage is sex discrimination.167  The basic argument for the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage as sex discrimination is as follows: X is a homosexual female 
who wants to marry Y, who is also a homosexual female; Z is a heterosexual male.  According to 
the present state of the marriage laws, X can marry Z but X cannot marry Y.  Therefore, X 
cannot marry whom she wants because of the sex of the partner, and this is sex discrimination 
because “but for” the sex of the partner, X could marry whomever she chose.168  This is the 
argument that the Hawaiian Supreme Court used to support its decision in Baehr to apply strict 
scrutiny to the state’s marriage law.169  Clearly, the counterargument is that the marriage laws 
truly do not discriminate on the basis of sex because the law applies equally to both men and 
                                                 
166 For a further discussion on this issue see generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
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168 See, e.g., GERSTMANN, supra note 3, at 15, 43, 45. 
169 “It is the state’s regulation of access to the statute of married persons, on the basis of the applicant’s sex, that 
gives rise to the question of whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws in 
violation of . . . the Hawaii Constitution.”  Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56 (emphasis added). 
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women in that men can only marry women and women can only marry men.170  Men and 
women, according to this argument, are treated equally under the law.  While this position may 
seem persuasive because it is factually correct, it is still discrimination on the basis of sex 
according to the Supreme Court’s definition of discrimination articulated in Loving.   
In Loving, the Court held that a law prohibiting interracial marriage was unconstitutional 
because it discriminated against individuals on the basis of race.171  The state of Virginia asserted 
the same argument as above, namely that the law did not discriminate on the basis of race 
because the law treated both races - whites and blacks - the same.172  Blacks could only marry 
blacks and whites could only marry whites, and, therefore, the statute applied equally to both 
groups.  Unfortunately for the state of Virginia and opponents to same-sex marriage but luckily 
for those who belief in all forms of equality, that argument failed.173  The Court held that the law 
did, in fact, discriminate on the basis of race and was found to be unconstitutional in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.174 
By analogy, the same argument should now fail for those who oppose same-sex marriage.  
If the law in Loving discriminated on the basis of race, the marriage laws discriminate on the 
basis of sex.  “[J]ust as it is race discrimination for the state to deny marriage licenses to black-
white couples because of the race of one partner, so it is sex discrimination for the state to deny 
                                                 
170 For example, in Lawrence, Justice Scalia, in dissent, argues that the prohibition of homosexual sodomy was not 
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marriage licenses to female-female couples because of the sex of one partner.”175  “The equal 
protection infirmity at work here is strikingly similar to (although, perhaps, more subtle than) the 
invidious discrimination perpetuated by Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws and unveiled in the 
decision of Loving v. Virginia . . . .”176  It would be contradictory of the Court to now hold that 
this same argument with regards to same-sex marriage is inapplicable.  This argument 
analogizing the present situation to Loving is logically and legally sound.  If there was 
discrimination on the basis of race in Loving, there is discrimination on the basis of sex in the 
current marriage laws.  To hold that the marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of sex, 
the Court would be repudiating its own logic and it would, therefore, overrule the basis and 
reasoning of Loving.  Discrimination is discrimination whether it is based on race or sex, and a 
ban on same-sex marriage is sex discrimination according to what the Supreme Court has 
defined as discrimination. 
c. Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Scrutiny, & Rational Basis 
Since this paper has already explained why a ban on same-sex marriage does not satisfy 
either strict scrutiny or rational basis, there is little need to repeat those arguments here, except 
that some brief comments specifically relating to same-sex marriage, rational basis, and equal 
protection should be mentioned.  Also, an analysis on the issue of whether a prohibition on same-
sex marriage can meet intermediate scrutiny, whether it applies because the marriage laws 
discriminate on the basis of sex or because homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class for equal 
protection purposes, is not necessary because, for the reasons discussed previously, it cannot.  If 
a denial of marriage to same-sex couples involves no rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest, it certainly cannot meet the more stringent intermediate scrutiny.   
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Regarding rational basis, “the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of 
whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious 
discrimination.”177  A law subject to the Equal Protection Clause that “identifies persons by a 
single trait and then denies them protection across the board” and cannot be adequately justified 
does not conform to constitutional requirements.178  Since a ban on same-sex marriage arbitrarily 
denies homosexuals the opportunity to marry, the only justification for the ban is due to the 
invidious discrimination against homosexuals and same-sex couples.  If the government cannot 
satisfy rational basis, the purpose of the law is inherently and purposefully to injure the 
discriminated group.  However, “[i]f . . . ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”179  Realizing that there is no rational basis for the 
denial of same-sex marriage, it is clear that the law is based on nothing more than animus 
towards homosexuals.  Yet the “[m]oral disapproval of [homosexuals] . . . is an interest that is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”180  Accordingly, 
a marriage law barring same-sex couples from marrying is not rational; it is discrimination of the 
worst kind because it is based on animosity toward homosexuals.    
IV. WHY CIVIL UNIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL: REVISITING BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE BUT EQUAL 
 
The most politically attractive response for those who support equal rights for same-sex 
couples but are skeptical of allowing them access to marriage is the civil union.  The civil union 
provides same-sex couples the same rights as married couples, such as the opportunity to adopt 
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children together, to collect alimony upon the dissolution of the relationship, to qualify for 
family health insurance, and receive several other benefits that are provided by the state to 
opposite-sex couples but only through a different institution.181  The civil union was first created 
in the United States by the Vermont legislature in response to the state’s supreme court’s 
declaration in Baker v. State that a ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.182  The 
Vermont Constitution, according to the court, only required that the legislature provide same-sex 
couples with the same rights as married couples, but it did not necessarily require that same-sex 
couples be allowed to marry.183  Therefore, the court allowed the legislature to develop a remedy 
to fit the Vermont Constitution’s mandate.184  The Vermont legislature’s answer was the civil 
union.185   
After Goodridge, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to follow the lead of Vermont 
and legalize civil unions.186  The legislature asked the Supreme Judicial Court whether a civil 
union would be a constitutional response to Goodridge, and the court emphatically rejected the 
possibility of the legislature enacting civil unions.187  “Segregating same-sex unions from 
opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally to advance or ‘preserve’ what we stated in 
Goodridge were the Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the 
conservation of resources.”188  Rather, the court correctly noted that the only appropriate remedy 
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would be to provide same-sex couples with the ability to marry.189  As of May 2004, same-sex 
marriage is legal in Massachusetts. 
The Supreme Judicial Court correctly held that civil unions are legally unacceptable, and 
on the federal level, the same is true because of the Court’s famous decision of Brown v. Board 
of Education where the Court struck down the notion that the doctrine of separate but equal was 
a valid constitutional response to race relations in the United States.190  The Court stated that to 
have the doctrine of separate but equal for educational facilities resulted in an inherent inequality 
for blacks.191  As a result of the separation, blacks were viewed as inferior by simply being 
separated and implicitly unworthy or unequal to whites, and they were, essentially, a group of 
second-class citizens.192  In Brown, the Court rightfully held that this doctrine could no longer be 
an adequate legislative choice. 
Keeping students separate on account of race truly did render African-American children 
inferior.  “Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect 
upon the colored children.  The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro 
group.”193  African-American children were not equal because the facilities that were provided to 
them were well below the type of facilities that were provided to white children.  But more 
importantly in the Court’s eyes was the fact that African-American children simply felt inferior 
because they were not allowed access to the same schools as whites.194  This is what truly made 
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them inferior.  Because they were kept separate, they viewed themselves as inferior and believed 
that society treated them as second-class citizens. 
It is notable that the Court rejected the doctrine of separate but equal in light of the fact 
that education has never been considered a fundamental right.195  Nonetheless, the court stated 
that education was one of the most important functions that state and local governments serve.196  
In fact, the Court considered education to be the “very foundation of good citizenship”, and it 
doubted whether a child could reasonably succeed in life without the proper education.197  
Therefore, the Supreme Court felt that this was an issue that must be equal on all fronts for each 
child.198  If the Court held that separate but equal applies even though it was not dealing with a 
fundamental right, it surely must apply in the present situation involving same-sex marriage 
where a fundamental right is involved.   
The same issues facing Brown are present in the same-sex marriage debate.  The civil 
union analogy is not quite on point with the situation of children in schools because in Brown the 
African-American children were actually provided with lower standard facilities and educational 
materials.  It would be much more difficult for the government to do the same with regards to 
marriage; it would be easier to determine if same-sex couples did not have the same legal rights 
as other couples.  In that sense, then, the civil union is much closer to being constitutionally 
permissible than the doctrine of separate but equal that occurred in Brown.  However, this 
discussion only relates to rights and privileges granted at the state level. 
On the federal level, if a state legislature enacted a civil union law as opposed to 
providing same-sex couples access to marriage, the couples would still be denied certain federal 
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statutory rights.  Under the Defense of Marriage Act, federal law defines marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman, and, as a result, same-sex couples joined in a civil union would not 
be entitled to the same federal benefits as heterosexual married couples even though they would 
receive equal rights on the state level.199  The federal rights that would still be denied to same-
sex couples include the benefits of joint filing for federal income tax purposes, the benefit of 
estate taxation, Social Security benefits, and many other federal requirements premised on the 
existence of a validly-recognized marriage.200  Therefore, even if a state were to allow civil 
unions for same-sex couples, they would not truly be equal until federal law recognized same-
sex marriage or the federal equivalent of the civil union.  In this sense, this issue becomes closer 
to the Brown analogy because same-sex couples given civil union rights still would not be fully 
granted equal rights according to the law.201 
However, what makes the civil union issue even more closely analogous to Brown is that 
it will likely have the same effect of creating second-class or inferior citizens.202  In declaring 
that a ban on same-sex marriage violated its state constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts announced that such a ban was unconstitutional because “[t]he Massachusetts 
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals.  It forbids the creation of second-
class citizens”, implying that same-sex couples would indeed be considered second-class citizens 
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if they were not allowed the right to marry.203  The court further re-emphasized this point in its 
opinion to the state senate on the issue of civil unions by stating “[b]ecause the proposed law by 
its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate 
same-sex couples to a different status.”204  The civil union, ultimately, “is a considered choice of 
language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to 
second-class status.”205 
By providing same-sex couples with their own legal relationship that is separate and 
distinct from that afforded opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples will undoubtedly feel inferior.  
In turn, society will also likely treat same-sex couples as less worthy than heterosexual couples 
because they cannot marry and cannot have the same access to marriage as every other couple.  
Society will, therefore, always be skeptical of same-sex couples and view them as somehow less 
than everyone else.  “Clearly, society broadcasts a message that the marital relationship should 
be respected, so if same-sex marriage is allowed, the message would be that those relationships 
are worthy of respect.”206  Conversely, denying them marriage but relegating same-sex couples 
to a separate institution would render them inferior and inherently unequal to heterosexual 
married couples.   
These are the reasons the Supreme Court used to ultimately strike down the doctrine of 
separate but equal in Brown.  It was not so much that individuals could not have separate yet 
equal rights; the problem was the effect of separate but equal resulting in inferiority to the 
excluded group, who were segregated for the reason that society did not view them as being 
worthy of equal respect and deserving of truly equal rights.  Therefore, civil unions as a response 
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to the same-sex marriage debate, while politically attractive, is nonetheless unconstitutional.  
Even though same-sex couples would have the same legal rights as opposite-sex couples, at least 
on the state level, they will still be treated differently and viewed as less respected than other 
legally married couples.  As the Court stated in Brown, the law will not tolerate this type of 
distinction.  If the doctrine of separate but equal did not survive for race relations, it should not 
survive the same-sex marriage debate for the same reasons – it creates a class of individuals who 
are separate and who are viewed as inherently inferior.  Civil unions do nothing more than stamp 
same-sex couples with the label of second-class citizens, which is constitutionally impermissible.   
CONCLUSION 
 In the public debate, the legal aspect of the same-sex marriage dispute is often ignored.  
However, a constitutional inquiry into same-sex marriage will likely be dispositive on the issue 
of whether it will ever be legal in the United States.  This issue presents intriguing constitutional 
questions, which are overlooked and unmentioned by the public.  Whether a citizen agrees with 
homosexuals or the lifestyle they lead is irrelevant.  One should at least recognize that our 
Constitution stands for certain principles, such as freedom and equality, and that these principles 
are unquestionably being denied to same-sex couples. What is important is that every citizen’s 
rights under the law and the Constitution be protected regardless of his or her sexual orientation.  
Above all, the Constitution protects the rights of every individual, not just the rights of 
heterosexuals.   
 This paper presents the constitutional case for same-sex marriage and explains why any 
ban on same-sex marriage is constitutionally inconsistent.  Our society has declared that 
marriage is an institution of fundamental importance.  Because marriage is important, it cannot 
be easily denied to a group of individuals.  The author admits that the arguments made above are 
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not flawless, but few arguments are.  There will always be people who believe that the 
homosexual lifestyle is a sin or simply not the “right” lifestyle, just as there are those who still 
oppose interracial marriage today despite the Court’s ruling in Loving.207  Yet unfortunately for 
those who oppose same-sex marriage, there is not a sound legal argument that can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  The Constitution guarantees certain rights to individuals and groups in 
spite of the fact that many people are adverse to their position or because of social animosity 
toward the group.  The Constitution protects and enforces minority views and positions where 
applicable.  In this case, the Constitution confers rights to heterosexuals and homosexuals alike 
that preserve their right to marry.  Under the Constitution, marriage cannot be defined as only a 
union between a man and a woman; it must include same-sex couples.   
In responding to the potential failure of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage, Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said, “Will activist judges not elected by 
the American people destroy the institution of marriage, or will the people protect marriage as 
the best way to raise children? My vote is with the people.”208  My vote, however, is with the 
Constitution. 
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